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Abstract
I examine a search model a la’ Burdett and Judd (1983). Consumers are
embedded in a consumers network, they may costly search for price quotations
and the information gathered are non-excludable along direct links. This al-
lows me to explore the effect of endogenous consumers externalities on market
functioning. I first show that when search costs are low consumers randomize
between searching for one price and two price quotations (high intensity search
equilibrium). Otherwise, consumers randomize between searching for one price
and not searching at all (low intensity search equilibrium). Second, in both
equilibria consumers search less frequently in denser networks. Finally, when
search costs are low the expected price and the social welfare increase as the
consumers network becomes denser. These results are reverse when search costs
are high.
∗Tinbergen Institute & Econometric Institute, Erasmus University Rotterdam. E-mail: gale-
otti@few.eur.nl
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1 Introduction
A large body of empirical work shows that a variety of informal relationships com-
plement the price system in coordinating the interaction among buyers and sellers in
the market. For example, in marketing it is well established that consumers obtain
much of their information via their social contacts (Feick and Price (1986, 1987)).
In relation to this, firms have increasingly recognized the need for using informal
channels as a way to market their products. The practice of consumers referral is an
example;1 according to the Direct Selling Association (1999), annual sales of firms
that rely entirely on consumer referral grew from 13 billion to nearly 23 billion dollars
between 1991 and 1998. Similarly, in the process of finding a job people rely heavily
on their social contacts to obtain information about job opportunities (Granovetter
(1974)). In medicine, and other specialized fields, professional networks shape the
adoption of new technologies (Coleman 1966).2
These examples share a common feature: informal relationships between agents trans-
form the information each individual privately obtains in a public good and this affects
players’ incentives as well as aggregate outcomes. This is the primary motivation for
the development of a theory which studies the interplay between network relation-
ships and market performance. This paper focuses on the role of social contacts in
shaping the incentives to search, firms’ pricing behavior and social welfare.
I examine a duopolistic version of Burdett and Judd (1983). On the supply side of
the market there are two firms producing a homogeneous good and they set prices
so as to maximize profits. Consumers have a common willingness to pay for the
good and buy at most a single unit. The only way for a transaction to take place
is that consumers have some information about prices. Consumers may individually
search for price quotations and, in this case, they must pay a fixed search cost for
each price quotation observed. In addition, consumers are embedded in a social
network and they obtain information freely from their direct neighbors. To maintain
symmetry on the consumers side I assume that each consumer holds the same number
of connections, say k.3 Once each consumer has searched, the information observed
is freely provided to his direct neighbors and then transactions take place. The game
is a one-shot simultaneous move game: firms set prices and consumers decide how
many searches to make at the same moment. I focus on symmetric Nash equilibria.
I note that when the network is empty (or inactive), i.e. k = 0, I obtain the duopolistic
version of Burdett and Judd (1983). By contrast, when k is positive, consumers
strategically choose their search intensity taking into account that the information
obtained is non-excludable across links. The non-excludability of price information
1Firms provide different sorts of benefits such as discounts to clients who bring new customers.
2I provide another example. Before competing in the market firms form agreements for the
development of new products and they share knowledge (Hagedoorn (2002)).
3Thus, the consumer network is a regular graph with degree k.
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across direct links creates information externalities across consumers, which clearly
affect consumers and firms incentives and therefore the market equilibrium outcome.
It is exactly the interplay between network relationships and market competitiveness
that is the focus of the present paper. I shall show that in more dense networks
consumers search less intensively and that in some instances firms charge on average
higher prices when consumers hold more connections. Furthermore, I shall show that
an increase in the density of the consumer network does not always enhance social
efficiency as well as consumer surplus.
I start by noticing that, similarly to the findings of Burdett and Judd (1983), equilib-
ria exhibit price dispersion. More interestingly, for any positive degree of the network
there are two types of price dispersed equilibria. The first is a high intensity search
equilibrium, where consumers randomize between searching for one price and two
prices. This equilibrium exists for low search costs. The other is a low intensity
search equilibrium where consumers randomize between searching for one price and
not searching at all and it exists for high search costs. By contrast, when the con-
sumers network is empty (or inactive) only the former equilibrium is strategically
viable. In what follows I discuss the properties of these equilibria. In particular, I am
interested in the effect of an increase in the degree of the network on the consumer
search intensity, expected prices and social welfare.
I first elaborate on the high intensity search equilibrium. The first observation is
that given that the degree of the network is strictly positive this equilibrium exists
for sufficiently low search costs. Further, as the degree of the network increases,
the existence region of this equilibrium shrinks. The intuition is that richer network
relationships make the marginal gains of searching twice instead of once lower. Thus,
for sufficiently high search costs (that is for sufficiently highmarginal costs of searching
twice instead of once) consumers cannot be indifferent between the two searching
alternatives. Second, I note that expected prices are higher the lower is the density of
the network, ceteris paribus. The reason is that the expected share of fully informed
consumers is, ceteris paribus, increasing in the degree of the network. Third, I show
that consumers search less frequently when network relationships are more dense. The
second and the third observation imply that an increase in the number of connections
has two opposite effects on the amount of information spread in the market. This
leads me to investigate the relation between the degree of the network and expected
prices.
Surprisingly, I show that the expected price is higher when the network is more dense.
The intuition is the following. An increase in the number of connections leads con-
sumers to free-ride more on each other. This reduces the expected share of fully in-
formed consumers, despite the fact that the consumers hold more connections. Since
firms compete less frequently, they charge on average higher prices. I also show that
social welfare is higher, while consumer surplus is lower, when the consumers network
is more dense. The increase in social welfare is due to the strategic substitutabil-
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ity between searching and network degree and the fact that consumers are active
with probability one. The former effect reduces the waste in search costs, while the
second assures that in equilibrium each possible transaction is indeed realized. The
decrease in consumer surplus is due to the fact that firms price less aggressively when
consumers hold more connections.
I finally turn to discuss the low intensity search equilibrium. I start by noticing that
this equilibrium exists for moderate search costs. Interestingly, for a given network
degree, the lowest search costs for which this equilibrium exists equals the highest
search cost for which the high intensity search equilibrium exists. Secondly, as in
the previous equilibrium, firms charge on average lower prices when the degree of the
network increases, provided that consumers’ behavior is fixed. Furthermore, also in
this case consumers search less frequently in more dense networks.
Third, in sharp contrast with the previous equilibrium, an increase in the degree of the
network lowers the expected equilibrium price. Therefore, when searching is relatively
expensive, denser consumer networks enhance firms’ competition. Interestingly, even
if network relationships are beneficial for consumers, i.e. consumer surplus increases,
they decrease social welfare. The reason is that as consumers free-ride more on each
other, the number of realized transactions in equilibrium decreases. This negative
effect offsets the saving on search costs.
This model relates to two branches of the economic literature: the theory of networks
and market and the search theory. I start to discuss the relation of this paper with
the theory of networks and market. The large empirical work on networks and mar-
ket is the primarily motivation for the development of a theory which examines the
effect of informal relationships on market competitiveness, e.g. Calvo-Armengol and
Jackson (2004a, 2004b), Corominas-Bosch (1999), Goyal and Joshi (2003), Kranton
and Minehart (2001). To the best of my knowledge the present paper is the first
which studies systematically the role of consumers networks and market function-
ing. The works which come closer to mine are Bramoulle and Kranton (2004) and
Goyal and Moraga (2001). The former examines a model of social learning where
individuals search costly for new information and the results of their searching are
non-excludable along links. While in Bramoulle and Kranton (2004) the benefit each
consumer obtains by searching is exogenously given, in the present paper it is the
outcome of firms’ competition. This allows me to investigate not only the implica-
tion of social connections on consumers’ search incentives, but also its indirect effect
on strategic pricing behavior and market performances. Goyal and Moraga (2001)
analyse a three-stages game where first firms form pairwise agreement for the devel-
opment of new products, then they set an R&D effort which is costly and provide a
reduction of the marginal production cost and finally they compete in the market.
They find that the R&D effort a firm chooses in each agreement is decreasing in the
effort that the partner firm sets and that this free-riding effect may lead to inefficient
market outcomes. While Goyal and Moraga (2001) focus on the impact of network
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relationships on the supply side of the market, the current paper focuses on network
relationships on the consumers side.
The consumer search literature is well established in economics, see for example An-
derson and Renault (2000), Bester (1994), Braverman (1980), Burdett and Coles
(1997), Burdett and Judd (1983), Morgan and Manning (1985), MacMinn (1980),
Janssen and Moraga-Gonzalez (2000, 2003), Stahl (1989,1996). I have already dis-
cussed above the relation between the present paper and the model of Burdett and
Judd (1983). Another paper which comes close to mine is Janssen and Moraga-
Gonzalez (2003). They study a version of Burdett and Judd (1983) where consumers
are ex-ante heterogeneous: one fraction of consumers are fully informed, while the
remaining fraction must search costly to obtain price information. Increasing the
fraction of fully informed consumers creates positive externalities for all consumers
by boosting competitiveness and therefore lowering the expected price. The present
paper provides a simple way of endogenizing externalities across consumers using net-
work relationships and it shows that this may create negative consumers externalities
which increase the expected price in equilibrium.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 5.2 I define formally the model.
Section 5.3 provides a preliminary equilibrium analysis. Section 5.4 and 5.5 charac-
terize equilibria and Section 5.6 concludes. Proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 The Model
I examine a model of non-sequential search where consumers are embedded in a
network of connections. On the supply side there are N = 2 firms which produce
a homogeneous good at constant returns to scale. I normalize their identical unit
production cost to zero, without loss of generality.
On the supply side there is a finite number of consumers which I denote as m. All
consumers are identical. They desire to buy a single unit of the product and their
maximum willingness to pay is p˜ > 0. For a transaction to take place consumers must
observe at least one price quotation. A consumer may search simultaneously and the
cost for each search is c > 0, where c < p˜. In addition, the price information each
consumer obtains is freely provided to his neighbors. To maintain symmetry on the
consumers side, I assume that the consumer network is a regular graph. Thus, the
degree of the network, say k, may varies between 0 to m − 1, and it represents the
number of connections each consumer holds.4
I note that when k = 0 the model is equivalent to a duopolistic version of Burdett and
Judd (1983). By contrast, as k becomes positive, consumers strategically choose their
search intensity taking into account that information gathered by their neighbors
4A regular graph may not exist when m is odd. Hence, in the paper we assume that m is even.
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is non-excludable along direct links. This clearly affects individual incentives and
therefore the market equilibrium outcomes. It is exactly the interplay between the
externalities produced by the consumers network and market performance the focus
of the present paper.5
Firms and consumers know the architecture of the network and play a simultaneous
move game. An individual firm chooses its price taking price choices of the rivals
as well as consumers’ search behavior as given. I denote a firm’s strategy by the
price distribution F (p) defined on a support σ; let p and p¯ be the lowerbound and
the upperbound of σ, respectively. Consumers form conjectures about the firms’ price
behavior and decide how many price observations to pay for. Once each consumer has
searched, information is transmitted to the immediate neighbors. A strategy profile
for a consumer is then a probability distribution over the set {0, 1, 2} . I denote as
qi,x the probability of consumer i to search x time; thus a consumer’s strategy is
{qx}2x=0 . I will consider symmetric Nash equilibria. A symmetric equilibrium is a
pair of strategies s =
©
F (p) , {qx}2x=0
ª
such that (a) Eπ (s) = π¯ for any p ∈ σ and (b)
{qx}2x=0 is an optimal search behavior given that the conjectures about firms’ price
behavior are correct.
3 Preliminary Analysis
The first observation is about the existence and characterization of equilibria in which
consumers employ pure strategies.
Proposition 3.1. For any k ≥ 0 and c > 0, the only equilibria in which con-
sumers use pure strategy take the following form: consumers never search, q0 = 1,
and firms charge a price p ∈ [p˜− c, p˜] .
This proposition leads me to investigate equilibria in which consumers use a mixed
strategy. The next Lemma shows the possible candidates for an equilibrium.
Proposition 3.2. In any equilibrium in which consumers employ a mixed strategy
firms price accordingly to an atomless price distribution, F (p) , defined on a convex
support σ. Moreover, if k = 0 then q1 + q2 = 1, q1, q2 ∈ (0, 1), while if k > 0, then
either q1 + q2 = 1, q1, q2 ∈ (0, 1) or q0 + q1 = 1, q0, q1 ∈ (0, 1) .
There are two main observations which follow from Proposition 3.2. The first is that,
despite the fact that consumers are fully homogenous, in any equilibrium price disper-
sion arises. Since consumers search randomly, ex-post in the market some consumers
are more informed than others; in line with Burdett and Judd (1983), this allows
5I am assuming that a consumer provides the information to his neighbors surely. This represents
a situation where local communication across consumers is perfect. More generally, I could relax
this assumption by assuming that information is transmitted with some probability ρ ∈ (0, 1). In
this new setting the results of this paper will carry on qualitatively.
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firms to extract profits by randomizing their prices. Second and more interestingly,
when the network does not play any role, e.g. k = 0, for an equilibrium consumers
must randomize between searching for one price and two prices. I refer to this as High
Intensity search. However, when network externalities are taken into account another
equilibrium candidate emerges where consumers randomize between searching once
and not searching at all. I call this Low Intensity search. The possibility of a low
intensity search equilibrium arises because the externalities produced in the consumer
network allow even consumers who do not search on their own to observe some prices
with strictly positive probability.
This preliminary analysis leads me to investigate the existence and the characteri-
zation of the high intensity and low intensity search equilibrium, respectively. As a
presentation strategy, for each equilibrium candidate I first characterize firms’ behav-
ior, taken as exogenous consumers’ strategy. This illustrates the direct effect that
networks have on the way firms strategically price. Next, I endogenize consumers’
behavior. Our main interest lies on the impact of network density on the consumers’
search intensity, firms’ pricing behavior and social welfare. Taken together, this anal-
ysis will clarify the effect of consumers’ networks on market competitiveness.
4 High search intensity
Suppose consumers randomize between searching once and searching twice, i.e. q1 +
q2 = 1, q1, q2 > 0. The expected number of consumers who observe only the price of
firm i, say Di, and the expected number of fully informed consumers, say Di,j, can
be written as follows,
Di (k, q1) =
mqk+11
2k+1
(1)
Di,j (k, q1) = m
µ
1− q
k+1
1
2k
¶
(2)
A consumer observes only the price of firm i (expression (1)) when he observes the
price of firm i, q1/2, and all his social contacts also observe only the price of firm
i, (q1/2)
k. Analogously, a consumer observes only the price of firm j with the same
probability that a consumer observes only the price of firm i, i.e. Di = Dj. Finally,
with the remaining probability (expression (2)) a consumer observes both prices. It
is readily seen that for a given q1, the more a network is dense (the higher is k), the
smaller is the fraction of partially informed consumers, expression (1), and the higher
is the fraction of fully informed consumers, expression (2).
Using (1) and (2), the expected profit to firm i is
Eπi (pi, pj; k, q1) = Di (k, q1) pi +Di,j (k, q1) pi [1− F (pi; k, q1)] (3)
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The next Proposition summarizes equilibrium pricing by firms.
Proposition 4.1. Assume q1 + q2 = 1, qx ∈ (0, 1) , x = 1, 2. In equilibrium:
F (p; k, q1) = 1−
qk+11
2
¡
2k − qk+11
¢ p˜− p
p
, ∀p ∈ [ q
k+1
1
2k+1 − qk+11
p˜, p˜]
Furthermore, F (p; k, q1) dominates in the first order stochastic sense F (p; k + 1, q1) ,
k = 0, ...,m− 1.
Not surprisingly, Proposition 4.1 shows that it is possible to rank the price distri-
butions with respect to k in the first-order stochastic sense: F (p, k, q1) first order
stochastically dominates F (p; k + 1, q1) . Therefore, as k increases, firms charge on
average lower prices. The intuition is as follows; when consumers hold more connec-
tions, the externalities in the consumers network are higher, ceteris paribus, which
in turn enhances competition among firms. Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium price
distribution for different levels of network density.
Figure 1. F (p, k) for q1 = 0.5 and p˜ = 1.
I now endogenize the consumers side. I denote as E(p) the price expected by a
consumer who searches only for one price quotation, while Emin(p) indicates the price
expected by a consumer who searches for two price quotations.6 The expected utilities
6Formally, E (p) (Emin (p)) is the expected value of one (two) draw from the price distribution.
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to a consumer from the two distinct searching alternatives are:7
Eu (q1 = 1) = p˜−
qk1
2k
E (p)−
µ
1− q
k
1
2k
¶
Emin (p)− c (4)
Eu (q2 = 1) = p˜−Emin (p)− 2c (5)
In words, an arbitrary consumer j who searches once, expression (4), observes only
one price quotation when all his social contacts are searching once as well, qk1 , and each
of them observes the same price quotation that j observes, 1/2k.With the remaining
probability consumer j is fully informed. In equilibrium a consumer should be indif-
ferent between the two different search alternatives, i.e. Eu (q1 = 1) = Eu (q2 = 1) .
This leads to the following equilibrium condition:
qk1
2k
[E (p)− Emin (p)] = c (6)
Each consumer trades-off the marginal cost of searching once more, c,with its marginal
gain. The marginal gain of searching twice instead of once is the difference between
buying at the expected price and at the expected minimum price, i.e. E(p)−Emin(p),
weighted for the probability with which a consumer who searches for one price will
indeed observe only one price quotation, i.e. qk1/2
k. When the network is empty,
i.e. k = 0, this marginal gain simply becomes the difference between the expected
price and the expected minimum price. The next result provides the full character-
ization of the high intensity search equilibrium for any given k = 0, ...,m − 1. Let
c¯ (k) = 1
2k(2k+1−2)
³
2k+1
2k+1−2 ln
¡
2k+1 − 1
¢
− 2
´
.
Theorem 4.1. If k = 0 there exists a c˜ > 0 such that for any c ∈ (0, c˜) a stable
high intensity search equilibrium exists where firms behave according to Proposition
4.1 and q∗1 is the smallest solution of (6). If k > 0, there exists c¯ (k) < c˜ such that
for any c ∈ (0, c¯ (k)) a high intensity search equilibrium exists where firms behave
according to Proposition 4.1 and q∗1 is the unique solution of (6). Furthermore, this
equilibrium is stable and c¯ (k) is decreasing in k.
I first elaborate on the existence condition of this equilibrium. Figure 2 below illus-
trates the equilibrium condition for different level of k. In the Figure I plot the LHS
of expression (6) for different level of k as a function of q1.
7More precisely expression 4 (resp. 5) indicates the expected utility of a consumer i who searches
for one price quotation (resp. for two price quotations), given that all other consumers are searching
for one price quotation with probability q1, and for two prices with the remaining probability, 1−q1.
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Figure 2. Equilibrium condition for k=0,1,2.
As already discussed, when k = 0 the model is equivalent to Burdett and Judd (1983).
In this case, for a given c there are at most two equilibria, but only one is stable.
Differently, when network externalities are allowed, there is a unique solution of the
equilibrium condition (6), which is also stable. Interestingly, for this equilibrium to
exist searching must be relatively inexpensive and as k increases the equilibrium exists
for smaller and smaller search costs. The intuition is as follows. Network externalities
reduce the marginal gains of searching twice instead of once and therefore for search
costs sufficiently high a consumer cannot be indifferent between the two searching
alternatives. The decrease in the marginal gains of searching twice is due to two
effects. The first is that the probability of a consumer who searches once to be ex-
post fully informed increases, and the second is that the difference between expected
price and expected minimum price decreases in k.
I now turn to analyse the effect of consumers network on search incentives, expected
prices, consumer surplus and social welfare. The next proposition summarizes the
findings.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose we move from k to k+1, k ∈ [1, ...,m− 2] and assume
that c < c¯ (k + 1). Then: (a) consumers search less frequently, i.e. q2 decreases,
(b) expected price increases (c) social welfare increases and (d) consumer surplus
decreases.
I would like to elaborate on three aspects of this comparative static result. The first
is that a consumer searches less frequently when the relationships in the network be-
come denser: an increasing in the network degree leads consumers to free-ride more
on each other. Secondly, this has a somewhat surprising effect on the equilibrium
pricing behavior of firms: expected price is higher in settings where consumers ex-
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change information more frequently. The intuition is the following. An increase in
the degree of the consumer network induces two effects. The first is highlighted in
Proposition 4.1 and it tells us that, keeping constant the consumers’ behavior, an
increase in the degree of the network increases the share of consumers which are ex-
post fully informed. The second is a free-riding effect: more connections lead players
to search less intensively and this results in a decreasing of expected fully informed
consumers. When consumers search intensively, the free-riding effect offsets the for-
mer effect. Thus, an increase in the degree of the network decreases the equilibrium
fraction of consumers which are fully informed; as a consequence firms compete less
intensively and the expected price increases. In Figure 3a below I plot the probability
of a consumer who searches once to be fully informed in equilibrium. In line with the
intuition above, figure 3a shows that for a given search cost the information in the
market decreases when the degree of the network increases. Figure 3b shows how the
expected price varies with respect to the degree of the network in equilibrium.
Figure 3a Figure 3b
Next, I note that consumer surplus decreases. This follows by noting that not only the
expected price decreases but the same holds for the expected minimum price. Finally,
I show that an increase in the degree of the network enhances social efficiency. This is
due to the fact that the free-riding effect leads to saving on the total search cost, yet,
since consumers search surely, each possible transaction is realized in equilibrium.
5 Low Intensity Searching
I now analyse the case in which consumers randomize between searching once and
not searching at all, i.e. q0 + q1 = 1, q0, q1 > 0. I start by considering consumers’
behavior as exogenously given. The expected fraction of consumers who observe only
the price of firm i, say Di, and the expected fraction of fully informed consumers, say
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Di,j, are:
Di (k, q0) =
m (1− q0)
2
kX
x=0
µ
k
x
¶
qk−x0 (1− q0)
x
2x
+ (7)
+mq0
kX
x=1
µ
k
x
¶
qk−x0 (1− q0)
x
2x
Di,j (k, q0) = m (1− q0)
Ã
1−
kX
x=0
µ
k
x
¶
qk−x0 (1− q0)
x
2x
!
+ (8)
+mq
Ã
1− qk0 − 2
kX
x=1
µ
k
x
¶
qk−x0 (1− q0)
x
2x
!
The interpretation of expression (7) is as follows: the first term denotes the fraction
of consumers who have searched once on their own and found firm i, i.e. m(1−q0)/2,
and that they have either received the same information or no information from their
neighbors; the second term indicates the fraction of consumers who did not search, but
that have received the price information of firm i from some of their social contacts.
Expression (8) as a similar interpretation. Expressions (7) and (8) can be rewritten
as follows:
Di (k, q0) =
m
h
(1 + q0)
k+1 − 2k+1qk+10
i
2k+1
(9)
Di,j (k, q0) =
m
h
2k
¡
1 + qk+10
¢
− (1 + q0)k+1
i
2k
(10)
Thus, the expected profit of firm i is:
Eπ (pi, pj; k, q0) = Di (k, q0) pi +Di (k, q0) pi [1− F (pi; k, q0)] (11)
The next Proposition summarizes the firms’ price behavior in equilibrium.
Proposition 5.1. Assume q0 + q1 = 1, qx ∈ (0, 1) , x = 0, 1. In equilibrium:
F (p; k, q0) = 1−
(1 + q0)
k+1 − 2k+1qk+10
2
³
2k
¡
1 + qk+10
¢
− (1 + q0)k+1
´ p˜− p
p
, ∀p ∈
"
(1 + q0)
k+1 − 2k+1qk+10
2k+1 − (1 + q0)k+1
p˜, p˜
#
Furthermore, F (p; k, q0) dominates in the first order stochastic sense F (p; k + 1, q0).
As in the high intensity search equilibrium, an increase in the degree of the network
has a direct effect on the way firms price: the more dense a network is, the lower the
expected price. This is illustrated in the Figure 4 below.
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Figure 4. F (p, k) for q0 = 0.5 and p˜ = 1.
I now endogenize the consumers’ search behavior. Let α (q0, k) =
Pk
x=0
¡
k
x
¢qk−x0 (1−q0)x
2x
and β (q0, k) =
Pk
x=1
¡
k
x
¢qk−x0 (1−q0)x
2x−1 ; the utility a consumer gets from the two distinct
search alternatives is:
Eu (q1 = 1) = p˜− α (q0, k)E (p)− (1− α (q0, k))Emin (p)− c (12)
Eu (q0 = 1) = p˜
¡
1− qk0
¢
− β (q0, k)E (p)−
¡
1− qk0 − β (q0, k)
¢
Emin (p) (13)
The interpretation of expression (12) is the following. Since a consumer searches once
on its own he always buys: he buys at the expected price whenever his neighbors
provide redundant or no information; otherwise he buys at the expected minimum
price. Differently, a consumer who does not search, expression (13), buys only when
at least one of his social contact searches,
¡
1− qk0
¢
. The expressions (12) and (13)
can be rewritten as follows:
Eu (q1 = 1) = p˜−
(1 + q0)
k
2k
E (p)−
Ã
2k − (1 + q0)k
2k
!
Emin (p)− c (14)
Eu (q0 = 1) = p˜
¡
1− qk0
¢
−
Ã
(1 + q0)
k − 2kqk0
2k−1
!
E (p)− (15)
−
Ã
2k−1
¡
1 + q0
k
¢
− (1 + q0)k
2k−1
!
Emin (p)
In equilibrium every consumer must be indifferent between searching once and not
searching at all, i.e Eu (q1 = 1) = Eu (q0 = 1) . This condition is satisfied if and only
13
if:
(1 + q0)
k − 2k+1qk0
2k
[E (p)−Emin (p)] + qk0 (p˜−Emin (p)) = c (16)
The interpretation of (16) is similar to the interpretation of (6). The next result shows
that for moderate value of search costs there exists at least a stable low intensity search
equilibrium.
Theorem 5.1. For any k > 0 there exists a c˜ such that for any c ∈ (c¯ (k) , c˜) a
stable low intensity search equilibrium exists where firms behave according to Propo-
sition 5.1 and q∗0 is the smallest solution of (16).
Theorem 5.1 tells us that for moderate search costs there exists at least a stable so-
lution of the equilibrium condition (16). The proof is in the appendix and also shows
that there always exists at least another solution of the equilibrium condition (16),
which however is not stable. Further, numerical simulations reveal that these are the
only two possible solutions.8 In what follows I focus on the stable equilibrium. I start
with a discussion of the existence of the low intensity search equilibrium. In Figure 5
below I plot the LHS of the equilibrium condition (16) with respect to q0 for different
levels of k.
Figure 5. F (p, k) for q0 = 0.5 and p˜ = 1.
I note that for any positive k the stable low intensity search equilibrium exists for
search costs which are higher than c¯ (k) . Moreover, when the search cost is exactly
equal to c¯ (k) in equilibrium consumers search once with probability one and the low
8I have run numerical simulations of the equilibrium condition (16) for k = 1, ..., 100. The simu-
lations reveal that there are at most two solutions, among which only the smaller one is stable.
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intensity and high intensity search equilibrium coincide.9 In contrast with the findings
of Burdett and Judd (1983), when the search costs are sufficiently high, consumers
free-ride on each other intensively and an equilibrium where consumers are always
active is not strategically viable. Furthermore, as k increases this equilibrium exists
for a wider range of parameters.
I now turn to examine the comparative statics with respect to k. The intractability
of the equilibrium condition (16), leads me to rely on simulations. The findings are
summarized in the following remark. 10
Remark 5.1. Suppose we move from k to k + 1 and assume that c ∈ (c (k) , c˜).
Then: (a) consumers search less frequently, i.e. q0 increases, (b) expected price de-
creases, (c) social welfare decreases and (d) consumer surplus increases.
The numerical simulations confirm that consumers free-ride more on each other in
denser networks. However, in sharp contrast with the high intensity search equilib-
rium, the effect on the way firms strategically price is reverse: the higher the density
of consumers network, the lower the expected price is. Figure 6a below shows the
expected probability for a consumer to be fully informed in equilibrium. Figure 6b
illustrates the expected price for different network degrees in equilibrium.
Figure 6a Figure 6b
Next, I note that total social welfare is decreasing in the density of the network. The
reason is that when the search cost is moderate, a consumer who completely relies on
his connections takes the risk to be ex-post completely ignorant about prices; in such a
9It is readily seen that the price distributions in Proposition 4.1 and 5.1 and the equilibrium
conditions (6) and (16) coincide when q1 = 1.
10I have run simulations for k = 1, ..., 100. For any k I first determine the range of the search
costs for which the stable equilibrium exists (the smaller solution of (16)), say [c1(k), c2(k)]. Next,
for each c ∈ [c1(k), c2(k)], I derive the stable solution of equation (16), q0 (k, c). Finally, using this
value I compute the expected price and the social welfare.
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case a transaction does not take place. When the degree of the network increases this
negative effect, due the temptation of consumers to be inactive, dominates the realized
savings in search cost and therefore the overall social welfare decreases. Finally, even
if social welfare decreases, consumers surplus increases in the density of the network
because both the expected price and the expected minimum price decrease.
6 Conclusion
I have developed a search model which examines the effect of endogenous externali-
ties, inherent in consumers network, in the consumers’ search incentives, firms’ price
behavior, consumer surplus and social welfare. I have shown that consumers search
less frequently in denser networks due to a free-riding effect. This has a somewhat
surprising implication on the firms’ price behavior as well as on the overall perfor-
mance of the market. In particular, when the search costs are sufficiently low the
equilibrium expected price is higher and the consumers welfare is lower in settings
where consumers networks are denser. Furthermore, when search costs are moderate,
the market outcome becomes more inefficient as networks density rises.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first model which examines the interplay be-
tween consumer networks and competition. There are many extensions which may be
of interest for further research. The first is to examine the implication of asymmetric
connections across players. Even if an analysis for any network architecture may be
unfeasible, one could focus on a particular class of networks which matches much em-
pirical evidence on social networks such as the star and variants of this architecture.
For example, in a star network a natural question which arises is whether the center
may use its structural position to extract private gains and what the implications for
the market outcomes are. A second extension would be to endogenize the formation
of the consumer network. A natural way of doing so is to consider a two-stage game
where in the first stage consumers invest in connections and in the second stage the
search game is played. A third extension would be to consider the impact of network
relationships in a sequential search model.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1.
First, it is easy to verify that the strategy profile {p, q0 = 1} , where p ∈ [p˜− c, p˜]
is a Nash equilibrium. I now prove that these are the only (generic) equilibria in
which consumers employ pure strategies. There are two possibilities, which I analyse
in turn. First, suppose q1 = 1; if k = 0, then each consumer will observe only
one price and as a consequence firms will charge p = p˜. However, as far as c >
0, a consumer strictly gains by not searching at all. Consider then that k > 0; I
claim that if this were an equilibrium then firms will price according to an atomless
price distribution F (p) defined on a convex support σ. The reason is that since
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k > 0 and q1 = 1 there is a fraction of consumers which will observe both firms’
prices with a strictly positive probability. Therefore, if firms charge a price p with
a mass point, they will tight at that price with strictly positive probability, but
then an individual firm has a strict incentive to undercut the atom. I now show
that, given k > 0, an equilibrium where consumers search once with probability
one, i.e. q1 = 1, exists for a unique value of the search cost (it is not generic).
The utility to a consumer is Eu (q1 = 1) = p˜ − 12kE (p) −
¡
1− 1
2k
¢
Emin (p) − c. In
equilibrium it must be the case that Eu (q1 = 1) ≥ Eud (qx = 1) , x = 0, 2, where
Eud (q0 = 1) = p˜− 12k−1E (p)−
¡
1− 1
2k−1
¢
Emin and Eud (q2 = 1) = p˜−Emin (p)− 2c.
Solving the two inequality I obtain that:
c =
1
2k
(E (p)−Emin)
Second, suppose q2 = 1 and k ≥ 0. It is easy to see that each consumer will observe
always two prices. If this were an equilibrium firms would charge the competitive
price, p = 0. However, a consumer is strictly better-off by searching only once. This
completes the proof of the Proposition.¥
Proof Proposition 3.2.
I first show that firms price according to an atomless price distribution F (p) . If
k = 0 the model degenerates to the duopoly version of Burdett and Judd (1983) and
the claim follows. Next, assume k > 0 and suppose there exists some price p∗ with
a mass point. Since consumers search at least once with some positive probability
and k > 0, it follows that a fraction of consumers observe two prices with strictly
positive probability. Therefore, firms would tie at the price p∗ with strictly positive
probability; in such a case a firm gains by undercutting p∗. This is a contradiction.
I finally show that for any k ≥ 0 the support σ must be convex. Suppose not, i.e.
∃σ˜ Ã σ : F (p) = c ∀p ∈ σ˜. Let p∗ = inf σ˜, then a firm charging p∗ gains by increasing
such price. This completes the proof of the first part of the Lemma.
I now show that if k > 0 in any equilibrium either q1 + q2 = 1, q1, q2 ∈ (0, 1) or
q0 + q1 = 1, q0, q1 ∈ (0, 1) . I start by claiming that q0 + q2 = 1 cannot be part
of an equilibrium. Suppose it is, then firms would set the competitive price with
probability one. The reason is that the expected demand of a firm derives from
two sources: consumers who search on their own and consumers who do not search
but obtain information from their social contacts. The former would always observe
two prices, while the latter either do not observe any price or they also observe two
prices. Using a standard undercutting argument it follows that firms must charge the
competitive price. Since firms charge the competitive price with probability one a
consumer strictly benefits by searching only once.
Next I show that q0 + q1 + q2 = 1 cannot be part of an equilibrium. Suppose it
is an equilibrium; the same argument above implies that F (p) is atomless and it is
defined on a convex support σ. In equilibrium it must be the case that Eu (qx = 1) =
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Eu (qy = 1) , x, y = 0, 1, 2. Let α (k) =
Pk
x=1
¡
k
x
¢qk−x0 qx1
2x
, then I obtain that:
Eu (q0 = 1) = p˜
¡
1− qk0
¢
− α (k)E (p)−
¡
1− qk0 − α (k)
¢
Emin (p)
Eu (q1 = 1) = p˜−
µ
qk0 +
α (k)
2
¶
E (p)−
µ
1− qk0 −
α (k)
2
¶
Emin (p)− c
Eu (q2 = 1) = p˜− Emin (p)− 2c
Solving for the equilibrium conditions it follows that:
qk0 [p˜−E (p)] = qk0 [E (p)− Emin (p)]
Given that q0 > 0 this condition is satisfied if and only if p˜−E (p) = E (p)−Emin (p).
I now show that this is impossible. To see this I note that
Emin (p) = 2E (p)−
Z p˜
p
2pf(p)F (p)dp
Therefore:
E (p)−Emin (p) =
Z p˜
p
2pf(p)F (p)dp−E (p) =
Integrating by parts I can show that:Z p˜
p
2pf(p)F (p)dp = p˜−
Z p˜
p
[F (p)]2 dp
which implies that:
E (p)− Emin (p) = [p˜−E (p)]−
Z p˜
p
[F (p)]2 dp < [p˜−E (p)] (17)
This is a contradiction and therefore the claim follows. Hence, the proof for the case
k ≥ 1 is complete.
I finally consider the case where k = 0. The same argument used for k ≥ 1, shows
that q0+ q2 = 1 and q0+ q1+ q2 = 1 cannot be part of an equilibrium. Therefore, the
only possibility left is q0 + q1 = 1. If this were an equilibrium firms would charge the
monopolist price. However, in such a case consumers cannot be indifferent between
not searching and searching once, i.e. Eu (q0 = 1) = 0 > −c = Eu (q1 = 1) . This
completes the proof of the Proposition.¥
High Search Intensity Equilibrium
Proof of Proposition 4.1.
I first note that the upper bound of the price distribution must be the reservation
price, p˜; for otherwise a firm charging p < p˜ strictly gains by increasing it. This
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implies that the expected equilibrium profit is: Eπ∗i (p˜, pj; k, q1) =
mqk+11
2k+1
p˜. In equi-
librium a firm i must be indifferent between charging any price in the support σ,
i.e. Eπi (pi, pj; k, q1) = Eπ∗i (p˜, pj; k, q1) , ∀p ∈ σ. Solving this condition I obtain the
expression of F (p; k, q1) and the expression of the lowerbound of the support is ob-
tained by solving for Eπi
³
p
i
, pj; k, q1
´
= Eπ∗i (p˜, pj; k, q1) . Finally, let ψ =
qk+11
2(2k−qk+11 )
,
then it is easy to see that ∂F (p;k,q1)
∂k
> 0 if and only if ∂ψ
∂k
=
qk+11 2
k−1
(2k−qk+11 )
2 ln
q1
2
< 0. This
completes the proof.¥
Proof Theorem 4.1.
The proof of the case k = 0 is the same as Burdett and Judd(1983) and therefore it
is omitted. I focus instead in the case k > 0.
Let us define the RHS of expression (6) as φ (p; k, q1) =
qk1
2k
[E (p)−Emin (p)] . I start
by showing that ∂φ(p;k,q1)
∂q1
> 0. Suppose, without loss of generality that p˜ = 1. Using
the expression of the price distribution F (p; k, q1) defined in proposition 5.3. I can
invert it to obtain:
p (z; k, q) =
1
g (z; k, q1)
(18)
where
g (z; k, q1) = 1 +
2
¡
2k − qk+1
¢
qk+1
(1− z) (19)
I now note that:
2k
qk1
φ (p; k, q1) = 2
Z 1
p(k,q1)
pf(p; k, q1) (1− F (p; k, q1)) dp−
Z 1
p(k,q1)
pf(p; k, q1)dp
Integrating by parts yields,
2k
qk1
φ (p; k, q1) =
Z 1
p(k,q1)
[F (p; k, q1) (1− F (p; k, q1))] dp
Using the inverse function p (z; k, q1) , I can write this expression as:
2k
qk1
φ (z; k, q1) =
Z 1
0
£
p
¡√
z; k, q1
¢
− p (z; k, q1)
¤
dz
Or,
2k
qk1
φ (z; k, q1) =
Z 1
0
p (z; k, q1) (2z − 1) dz
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Let a = qk+1, b = 2
¡
2k − qk+1
¢
and c = 2k+1 (2k + 1) , then,
2k
q2k1
∂φ (z; k, q1)
∂q1
=
Z 1
0
[ka (2z − 1) + c (1− z)] (2z − 1)
[a+ b (1− z)]2
dz
= −
Z 1\2
0
[ka (2z − 1) + c (1− z)] (1− 2z)
[a+ b (1− z)]2
dz +
+
Z 1
1\2
[ka (2z − 1) + c (1− z)] (2z − 1)
[a+ b (1− z)]2
dz
I note that [ka(2z−1)+c(1−z)]
[a+b(1−z)]2 is positive and increasing in z for any z ∈ (0, 1/2) and that
[a+ b (1− z)]2 is decreasing in z. Therefore:
2k
q2k1
∂φ (z; k, q1)
∂q1
> −
Z 1\2
0
2k (2k + 1) (1− 2z)
22k
dz+
Z 1
1\2
[ka (2z − 1) + c (1− z)] (2z − 1)
22k
dz
I now note that [ka (2z − 1) + c (1− z)] is positive and it is decreasing in z, which
implies that:
2k
q2k1
∂φ (z; k, q1)
∂q1
> −
Z 1\2
0
2k (2k + 1) (1− 2z)
22k
dz +
Z 1
1\2
qk+11 k (2z − 1)
22k
dz
>
µ
2k (2k + 1) + qk+11 k
22k
¶Z 1
0
(2z − 1) dz
>
µ
2k (2k + 1) + qk+11 k
22k
¶Ã
(2z − 1)2
4
!1
0
= 0
Next, I note that limq→0 φ (p; k, q1) = 0 and that limq→1 φ (p; k, q1) = c (k) . The facts
that ∂φ(z;k,q1)
∂q1
> 0, limq→0 φ (p; k, q1) = 0 and limq→1 φ (p; k, q1) = c (k) imply that for
any c ∈ (0, c (k)) there exists a unique solution, say q∗1 ∈ (0, 1) , of the equilibrium
condition (6), i.e. φ (p; k, q∗1) = c.
I finally show that consumers do not want to deviate. Given that all consumers
randomize between searching once and twice, the expected utility to a consumer who
deviates by not searching at all is:
Eud (q0 = 1) = p˜−
qk1
2k−1
E (p)−
µ
1− q
k
1
2k−1
¶
Emin (p)
For an equilibrium it must be the case that Eud (q0 = 1) ≤ Eu (q1 = 1) . Using the
expression (4) it follows that this deviation is not profitable if and only if:
c ≤ q
k
1
2k
[E (p)−Emin (p)]
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This condition is always satisfied because in equilibrium c = q
k
1
2k
[E (p)−Emin (p)]. This
completes the proof of the Theorem. ¥
Proof Proposition 4.2.
I recall that the RHS of the equilibrium condition (6) may be written as:
φ (z; k, q1) =
Z 1
0
qk1
2k
p (z; k, q1) (2z − 1) dz
First, I show that ∂φ(z;k,q1)
∂k
< 0. The derivative of φ (z; k, q1) with respect to k is:
∂φ (z; k, q1)
∂k
= −q
2k+1
1
2k
ln
2
q1
Z 1
0
Ã
qk+11 + 2
¡
2k+1 − qk+11
¢
(1− z)£
qk+11 + 2
¡
2k − qk+11
¢
(1− z)
¤2
!
(2z − 1) dz +
+
q2k+11
2k
ln q1
Z 1
0
qk+11 (2z − 1)
2£
qk+11 + 2
¡
2k − qk+11
¢
(1− z)
¤2dz
I note that the second term of this expression is weakly negative and that −q
2k+1
1
2k
ln 2
q1
is also weakly negative. Therefore it is sufficient to show that:
ξ =
Z 1
0
Ã
qk+11 + 2
¡
2k+1 − qk+11
¢
(1− z)£
qk+11 + 2
¡
2k − qk+11
¢
(1− z)
¤2
!
(2z − 1) dz > 0
To see this note that:
ξ = −
Z 1/2
0
Ã
qk+11 + 2
¡
2k+1 − qk+11
¢
(1− z)£
qk+11 + 2
¡
2k − qk+11
¢
(1− z)
¤2
!
(1− 2z) +
+
Z 1
1/2
Ã
qk+11 + 2
¡
2k+1 − qk+11
¢
(1− z)£
qk+11 + 2
¡
2k − qk+11
¢
(1− z)
¤2
!
(1− 2z)
Since
µ
qk+11 +2(2k+1−q
k+1
1 )(1−z)
[qk+11 +2(2k−q
k+1
1 )(1−z)]
2
¶
is increasing in z for z ∈ (0, 1/2) and
£
qk+11 + 2
¡
2k − qk+11
¢
(1− z)
¤
is decreasing in z, then:
ξ > −
Z 1/2
0
µ
2k+1
22k
¶
(1− 2z) +
Z 1
1/2
Ã
qk+11 + 2
¡
2k+1 − qk+11
¢
(1− z)
22k
!
(1− 2z)
Furthermore, qk+11 +2
¡
2k+1 − qk+11
¢
(1− z) is also decreasing in z, which implies that
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ξ > −
Z 1/2
0
2k+1
22k
(1− 2z) +
Z 1
1/2
qk+11
22k
(1− 2z) =
=
2k+1 + qk+11
22k
Z 1
0
(2z − 1) dz
=
2k+1 + qk+11
22k
Ã
(2z − 1)2
4
!1
0
= 0
The fact that ∂φ(z;k,q1)
∂k
< 0 and that ∂φ(z;k,q1)
∂q1
> 0 implies that if k increases then q1
must also increase.
Second, I show that if k increases, then expected prices increase as well. Let ψ (k, q1) =
qk+11
2(2k−qk+11 )
, then the expression of the price distribution defined in Proposition 4.1 can
be rewritten as:
F (p) = 1− ψp˜− p
p
To prove the claim it is enough to show that:
dψ
dk
=
∂ψ
∂k
+ ψ
∂q1
∂k
> 0
I denote φk (k, q1) = ∂φ (k, q1) /∂k and φq1 (k, q1) = ∂φ (k, q1) /∂q1. Using the equi-
librium condition φ (k, q1)− c = 0 and applying the implicit function theorem I can
derive
∂q
∂k
= − φk (·)
φq1 (·)
where
φk (k, q1) = −
qk1
2k
ln
2
q1
ψ[(1 + 2ψ) ln
1 + ψ
ψ
− 2] + q
k
1
2k
ψk[(1 + 4ψ) ln
1 + ψ
ψ
− 3 + 4ψ
1 + ψ
]
φq1 (q1, k) =
kqk−11
2k
ψ[(1 + 2ψ) ln
1 + ψ
ψ
− 2] + q
k
1
2k
ψq1 [(1 + 4ψ) ln
1 + ψ
ψ
− 3 + 4ψ
1 + ψ
]
Plugging the expressions ∂q1
∂k
in dψ
dk
, I obtain that
dψ
dk
=
ψ
φq1
µµ
(1 + 2ψ) ln
1 + ψ
ψ
− 2
¶µ
ψk
kqk−1
2k
+ ψq1
qk1
2k
ln
2
q1
¶¶
Since φq1 and ψ (q1, k) are strictly positive it follows that
dψ
dk
> 0 if and only ifµ
(1 + 2ψ) ln
1 + ψ
ψ
− 2
¶µ
ψk
kqk−11
2k
+ ψq1
qk1
2k
ln
2
q1
¶
> 0
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Computing the derivatives ψk = −
qk+11 2
k
2(2k−qk+11 )
2 ln
2
q1
and ψq1 =
(k+1)qk12
k
2(2k−qk+11 )
2 it follows
that: µ
ψk
kqk−11
2k
+ ψq1
qk1
2k
ln
2
q1
¶
=
q2k1
2
¡
2k − qk+11
¢2 ln 2q1 > 0
Furthermore, using the expression of ψ (k, q1) I obtain that:
(1 + 2ψ) ln
1 + ψ
ψ
− 2 = 2
k
2k − qk+11
ln
Ã¡
2k+1 − qk+11
¢
qk+1
!
− 2 >
>
2k
2k − 1 ln
¡
2k+1 − 1
¢
− 2 >
> −2 + 2 ln 3 > 0
This proves the claim.
Third, I show that social welfare increases as k increases. To see this note that for a
given k, the social welfare is SW (k, q1, c) = p˜− q1c− (1− q1) 2c = p˜− 2c+ q1c; since
when k increases, q1 increases then social welfare increases as well.
Finally, I show that the consumer surplus decreases as k increases. To see this note
that the consumer surplus is CS = Eu (q1 = 1) = Eu (q2 = 1) = p˜ − Emin (p) −
2c. Given he price distribution F (p; k, q1) , the distribution of the minimum price
is Fmin (p; , k, q1) = F (p; k, q1) (2− F (p; , k, q1)) . Using the expression for F (p; k, q1)
illustrated in proposition 5.3. I obtain Fmin (p; , k, q1) = 1 − ψ2
³
p˜−p
p
´2
. Therefore
∂Fmin(p;,k,q1)
∂k
< 0 if and only if dψ
dk
> 0, which follows from above. This completes the
proof.¥
Low Search Intensity Equilibrium
Proof of Proposition 5.1.
I first note that for an equilibrium p = p˜; for otherwise a firm charging p¯ < p˜ strictly
gains by increasing such price. Using expression 11 and the fact that p = p˜, it follows
that the expected equilibrium profit is Eπ∗ =
³
m
³
(1 + q)k+1 − 2k+1qk+1
´
/2k+1
´
p˜.
In equilibrium it must be the case that Eπ (p) = Eπ∗ ∀ p ∈ σ. Solving the equilibrium
conditions I obtain the expression for F (p; k) . Similarly, the expression of the lower-
bound is the solution of Eπ
¡
p
¢
= Eπ∗. Finally, let ψ (k, q0) =
(1+q0)
k+1−2k+1qk+10
2(2k(1+qk+10 )−(1+q0)
k+1)
;
then to prove the first order stochastic dominance relation it is enough to see that
∂ψ(k,q0)
∂k
=
[2k(1−qk+10 )(1+q0)
k+1(ln(1+q0)−ln 2)+2kqk+10 ((1+q0)
k+1−2k+1qk+10 ) ln(q0)]
2(2k(1+q(k+1))−(1+q)k+1)
2 < 0.¥
Proof of Theorem 5.1.
Without loss of generality let p˜ = 1. Using the expression of the price distribution
23
F (p; k, q0) defined in proposition 5.4, I can invert it to obtain:
p (z, k, q0) =
1
g (z; k, q0)
(20)
where
g (z; k, q0) = 1 +
2k+1
¡
1 + qk+10
¢
− 2 (1 + q0)k+1
(1 + q0)
k+1 − 2k+1qk+10
(1− z) (21)
Using (20) the equilibrium condition (16) can be rewritten as follows:
(1 + q0)
k − 2k+1qk0
2k
Z 1
0
p (z, k, q0) (2z − 1) dz+qk0
µ
1− 2
Z 1
0
p (z, k, q0) (1− z) dz
¶
= c
(22)
I denote as ρ (z; k, q0) the LHS of 22 and I note that:
lim
q0→0
ρ (z; k, q0) = c¯ (k)
lim
q0→1
ρ (z; k, q0) = 0
Furthermore, I note that limit when q0 goes to zero of the derivative of ρ (z, k, q) is
positive:11
lim
q0→0
∂ρ (z; , k, q0)
∂q0
= 1
Hence, since ρ (q0, k) is positive at q0 = 0, increasing in the neighbor of q0 = 0 and it
is zero at q0 = 1 it follows that for any k > 0 there exists a c˜ > c¯ (k) such that for
any c ∈ [c¯ (k) , c˜] There exists at least two solutions of the equilibrium condition (16).
It is easy to see that among these two solutions only the smaller one is stable.
I finally show that a consumer does not have an incentive to deviate. The expected
utility to a consumer who deviates by searching twice is:
Eud (q2 = 1) = p˜−Emin (p)− 2c
For an equilibrium it must be the case that this deviation is not profitable, i.e.
Eud (q2 = 1) ≤ Eu (q1 = 1) . Using the expression (14) I obtain that Eud (q2 = 1) ≤
Eu (q1 = 1) if and only if:
c ≥ (1 + q0)
k
2k
[E (p)−Emin (p)]
11I develop the result using the program Mathematica. To do this I compute the following transfor-
mation. Let ρq0 (q0, k) =
∂ρ(q0,k)
q0 , then limq0→0 ρq0 (q0, k) = e
limq0→0 ln(ρq0 (q0,k))
q0
. The computation
is avaialable upon request of the author.
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Using the equilibrium condition (16), I can rewrite this inequality as
E (p)−Emin (p) ≤ p˜− E (p)
In the proof of proposition 5.2 I have shown that:
E (p)− Emin (p) = [p˜−E (p)]−
Z p˜
p
[F (p)]2 dp < [p˜−E (p)]
Hence, given that all consumers randomized between searching once and not searching
at all, a consumer does not want to deviate by searching twice. This completes the
proof.¥
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